docs(policy): fix guardrails docstring drift and temporal test-table row (#1986)

* docs(policy): fix guardrails docstring drift and temporal test-table row

- 02-guardrails-in-policy/deploy.py: the ApplicationTool free-text field is
  'message' in the actual tool schema and all four guardrail policies scan
  context.input.message, but the module docstring, tool description, and a
  comment referred to a nonexistent 'customer_notes' field. Also the SSN
  policy is named 'block_ssn' in code but the docstring listed 'block_pii'.
  Aligned the docs with the code (no runtime change).

- 03-temporal-policies/bankingassistant/README.md: Policy 1 test-table row 3
  was self-contradictory (prompt said 'to ACC-2003', the to_account column
  said 'ACC-9999', and the looked-up account was ACC-2002). Made the prompt
  and column agree on ACC-9999 and named the looked-up account in the DENY
  reason so the walkthrough is coherent.

* style(policy): fix pre-existing ruff findings in guardrails deploy.py

The python-lint CI gate runs ruff on the full changed file, so editing
deploy.py surfaced 4 pre-existing findings unrelated to the docstring fix:
- RUF013 implicit Optional on get_aws_context(region, profile) -> str | None
- S110/BLE001 blind except Exception: pass in add_lambda_gateway_permission
  -> narrowed to except ClientError with an explanatory comment (idempotent
  permission removal; the statement legitimately may not exist on first run).
No behavior change.

---------

Co-authored-by: rbelson@amazon.com <rbelson@amazon.com>

Author: rhbelson

01-features/07-centralize-and-govern-your-ai-infrastructure/02-policy/02-guardrails-in-policy/deploy.py

@@ -3,17 +3,17 @@
 
 Creates an insurance underwriting environment with content safety guardrails:
 
-  1. Lambda tools   — ApplicationTool (with customer_notes), RiskModelTool, ApprovalTool
+  1. Lambda tools   — ApplicationTool (with message), RiskModelTool, ApprovalTool
   2. IAM role       — Lambda execution role
   3. Gateway        — AgentCore MCP Gateway (IAM auth)
   4. Targets        — Three Lambda targets with tool schemas
   5. Policy Engine  — Cedar policy engine
   6. Base permit    — Cedar PERMIT allowing all traffic (guardrail FORBIDs override)
   7. Guardrail policies:
-       - block_violence       : content filter on customer_notes (VIOLENCE >= 0.5)
-       - block_jailbreak      : prompt attack on customer_notes (JAILBREAK >= 0.7)
-       - block_pii            : sensitive info on customer_notes (SSN >= 0.5)
-       - block_credit_cards   : sensitive info on customer_notes (CREDIT_CARD >= 0.5)
+       - block_violence       : content filter on message (VIOLENCE >= 0.5)
+       - block_jailbreak      : prompt attack on message (JAILBREAK >= 0.7)
+       - block_ssn            : sensitive info on message (SSN >= 0.5)
+       - block_credit_cards   : sensitive info on message (CREDIT_CARD >= 0.5)
   8. Attach engine   — ENFORCE mode on the gateway
 
 All output is written to guardrail_config.json.
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
         "schema": [
             {
                 "name": "create_application",
-                "description": "Create an insurance application with geographic validation. Use customer_notes for any free-text notes about the applicant.",
+                "description": "Create an insurance application with geographic validation. Use message for any free-text notes about the applicant.",
                 "inputSchema": {
                     "type": "object",
                     "properties": {
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@
 # ── AWS Session Setup ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 
-def get_aws_context(region: str = None, profile: str = None) -> tuple:
+def get_aws_context(region: str | None = None, profile: str | None = None) -> tuple:
     """Return (session, REGION, ACCOUNT_ID)."""
     session = boto3.Session(profile_name=profile)
     resolved_region = region or session.region_name or os.environ.get("AWS_DEFAULT_REGION")
@@ -196,7 +196,8 @@ def add_lambda_gateway_permission(lambda_client, function_name: str, gateway_arn
     statement_id = "AllowAgentCoreGateway"
     try:
         lambda_client.remove_permission(FunctionName=function_name, StatementId=statement_id)
-    except Exception:
+    except ClientError:
+        # Statement does not exist yet on first run — safe to ignore and re-add below.
         pass
     lambda_client.add_permission(
         FunctionName=function_name,
@@ -469,7 +470,7 @@ def create_all_guardrail_policies(ctrl, engine_id: str, gateway_arn: str) -> dic
     print("\n[Step 5] Creating guardrail policies...")
 
     resource = f'AgentCore::Gateway::"{gateway_arn}"'
-    # Action that carries the customer_notes free-text field.
+    # Action that carries the message free-text field.
     # Format: <TargetName>___<toolMethodName>
     action = 'AgentCore::Action::"ApplicationToolTarget___create_application"'
     scope = f"principal, action == {action}, resource == {resource}"

01-features/07-centralize-and-govern-your-ai-infrastructure/02-policy/03-temporal-policies/bankingassistant/README.md

@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ when { context.input.amount <= 10000 };
 | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
 | 1 | Check the balance of ACC-2002 | - | ALLOW |
 | 2 | , then transfer $500 from ACC-1001 to ACC-2002 | ACC-2002 | ALLOW |
-| 3 | Transfer $500 from ACC-1001 to ACC-2003 | ACC-9999 | DENY (destination does not match the looked-up account) |
+| 3 | Transfer $500 from ACC-1001 to ACC-9999 | ACC-9999 | DENY (destination does not match the looked-up account ACC-2002) |
 
 </details>