chore(deps): bump modernc.org/sqlite from 1.52.0 to 1.53.0 #104
Workflow file for this run
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| name: Claude PR Review | |
| # Automatic reviewer-POV review when a PR to main is opened. Auth is the Claude | |
| # Max subscription via CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN (no API billing, no per-call cost) — | |
| # generate it locally once with `claude setup-token` and add it as a repo secret. | |
| # Re-review on demand by commenting "@claude" (see claude.yml). Add `synchronize` | |
| # below if you also want a fresh review on every push. | |
| # | |
| # Fork PRs are skipped (not failed): GitHub does not expose repo secrets to PRs | |
| # from forks, so the token is unavailable and the action can only fail. External | |
| # contributions are instead reviewed on demand — the maintainer comments "@claude" | |
| # (claude.yml runs on issue_comment in the base-repo context, where the secret IS | |
| # available, and is locked to prashar32). | |
| on: | |
| pull_request: | |
| types: [opened, reopened] | |
| permissions: | |
| contents: read | |
| pull-requests: write | |
| id-token: write # required: the action authenticates to GitHub via OIDC | |
| jobs: | |
| review: | |
| # Same-repo, human-authored PRs only. On a fork PR head.repo.full_name differs | |
| # from the repo; on a Dependabot PR the run gets a restricted token with no | |
| # access to repo secrets. In both cases CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN is absent and | |
| # this job could only fail — so skip it (a clean skip, not a red X). Both are | |
| # instead reviewed on demand: comment "@claude" (claude.yml runs in the base-repo | |
| # context where the secret IS available). | |
| if: >- | |
| github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name == github.repository && | |
| github.actor != 'dependabot[bot]' | |
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | |
| steps: | |
| - uses: actions/checkout@v7 | |
| with: | |
| fetch-depth: 0 | |
| - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@v1 | |
| with: | |
| claude_code_oauth_token: ${{ secrets.CLAUDE_CODE_OAUTH_TOKEN }} | |
| prompt: | | |
| Review this pull request as a senior reviewer for RiskKernel — a | |
| deterministic, self-hosted reliability runtime for AI agents. Post | |
| concise, actionable inline comments on the specific lines; if the PR | |
| is clean, say so briefly. Prioritise: | |
| 1. Correctness & bugs — concurrency, error handling, edge cases. | |
| 2. Security — path/SSRF/injection, integer overflow, unsafe file or | |
| exec handling, and secret handling. No data may leave the host | |
| except calls to the user-configured provider, OTLP, and approval | |
| webhook endpoints (see SECURITY.md). | |
| 3. The core invariant — ALL enforcement (token/dollar/loop/time | |
| budgets, kill switch, approval gating, routing, retries, | |
| checkpoint/resume) stays deterministic Go and is NEVER delegated to | |
| an LLM. | |
| 4. Backwards compatibility — api/v1 request/response shapes, the config | |
| schema, and SQLite migrations (forward-only; never edit a shipped | |
| migration). | |
| 5. Tests — safety-critical paths (governor, approval gate, checkpoint | |
| manager) need exhaustive coverage. | |
| 6. Surface any new CodeQL-style risks (e.g. tainted input reaching a | |
| file path or a command) before they land. |