In many cases the price which a bidder offers for some good may depend on the other goods he buys. Thus, it seems advantageous that prices are offered not for single goods but for sets of goods (items) to be sold. The corresponding type of auction is called combinatorial auction.
A combinatorial auction is of specific interest if some goods are considered to be complementary for the bidder, i.e. the value of a set of items is higher than the sum of the values of the single items. As an example consider a technical equipment consisting of several parts which has a higher value if bought as a whole bundle.
There are several ways of winner determination, i.e. to determine those sets of bids which are accepted by the auctioneer. One possible way is defined as the combinatorial auction problem: An auctioneer gets price offers for sets of items and his goal is to allocate the items to the bidders such that the turnover, reflecting his personal revenue, is maximized.
Formally, in the combinatorial auction problem we have given a set
This combinatorial auction model is also called a single-unit combinatorial auction, because there is exactly one copy of each item available. Since the problem is in principle equivalent to a weighted set packing problem, it is strongly NP-hard.
- U. Pferschy, D. Pisinger, Knapsack Problems, 2004, DOI
